Stockrabit · Analysts
Questions across 10 calls

Krishnan ASV

HDFC Securities

City Union Bank Limited

City Union Bank Limited CC-Jun25.pdf · 2025-08-13
My questions have largely been answered. I just got one query. This is pertaining to just the demand environment within MSME. There has generally been a feeling that working capital requirements are pretty low because inflation is pretty benign. Just wanted to understand what you are hearing, what you are sensing from the ground, what your RMs are actually telling you?
I guess I am asking you because you kept highlighting that retail is relatively new only in the second quarter. Jewel loans remain where they were. A bulk of your credit growth has come on the back of MSMEs. But given that we are in a benign period, I was just wondering, are there any early signs about this growth beginning to taper off?
City Union Bank Limited CC-Jun24.pdf · 2024-06-24
If you could just throw some light around this entire BCG exercise. More importantly, what percentage of your existing customer base, according to your own analytics, becomes eligible for this end to end digital journey in terms of being just pre-approved so that they can go through the pipe. I mean, have you had some initial assessment around this? What is your assessment of where we are today? You said you had built a 300-400 crs portfolio already. Just wanted to understand your early experience in this portfolio and what's the kind of addressable market that you think within your own because it's meant for ETB. Was trying to understand that.
Understood. And purely on this unsecured piece which is meant for retail unsecured, just wanted to understand how, so is that also meant predominantly for ETB customers who we have already been banking with or does that book also expand into NTB customers?

Star Health and Allied Insurance Company Limited

Star Health and Allied Insurance Company Limited CC-Mar25.pdf · 2025-04-30
I wanted to understand kind of what you answered to the previous query as well you said 20% to 40% hike, you have taken price corrections in the agency portfolio, in th e Banca portfolio, and this 70% loss ratio is despite all of that . You have been taking price corrections for nearly two, two and a half years now, starting from the family floater. I just want to understand how bad the current portfolio is ? Is it largely backed book underwriting which had gone wrong, which is now causing all this pain, is there any reason to believe that your flow in the book that you have seen in the last year, year and a half is any better?
Understood. The other thing is, you mentioned both seve rity and frequency which have seen structural changes, can you just walk us through or quantify this a little bit for us? What do you see on ground today, vis-à-vis what you expect say three years back, both in terms of frequency as well as in terms of sev erity, because what we find is incidence rates have gone up , but just want to understand if you could kind of help us to quantify that, what did you expect in three years back, what is the reality today?

RBL Bank Limited

RBL Bank Limited CC-Mar25.pdf · 2025-04-25
So my first question was about these new guardrails and just the bank's approach to these new guardrails. How does your customer selection change on the ground now when there are -- when you face up with borrowers who have more than 3 vendors? Could you just talk us through that a little bit? Number 1. Number 2 from the cards portfolio, right, on the cards portfolio, there is a certain potential profitability that you would assess for the cards business as we stand today, right? That would be the potential and where we are, you are aware of at the end of FY '25. How long would you think it would take us to get to potential profitability on the cards business?
What I mean is if you now encounter a customer who is supposing with 4 lenders, right, how do you decide whether you need to withdraw from this customers? I mean, what are you looking at, at that borrower level?

Axis Bank Limited

Axis Bank Limited CC-Mar25.pdf · 2025-04-25
Yes. Hi, very good evening. I just wanted to say on the savings rate cut that's happened across the system, and this is not just proactive plan. But just trying to understand, in a sense, once you have taken a price cut on the deposit side, is it not logical to assume that you'll also have to pass this benefit on to consumers? Wouldn't there be a regulatory expectation that this has passed through the MCLR line to the consumers? Why should a bank be able to retain the gains from the savings rate cut?
Understood. I could understand the fact that the term deposits repricing does take through incrementally versus the savings went through the stock. But I was just trying to understand, doesn't the savings rate cut feed into MCLR, even if it's just 20%, 30% of your portfolio. I understand the bulk of your portfolio and for the banking system at large is now 50% plus with the repo-linked. But there's still an MCLR linked book. That will have to see transmission at some stage, right? It's not a free lunch for banks. Is that a fair assumption?

SBI Cards and Payment Services Limited

SBI Cards and Payment Services Limited CC-Dec24.pdf · 2025-01-28
As Girish just mentioned, it's been nearly 2 years since our origination has been tweaked, improved just to get better quality of sourcing. Despite that, the write-offs or the overall credit costs seem to be hitting a record high almost every quarter. Also, it's fairly evident that the collection environment has been fairly tight , has been fairly difficult both for banks and NBFCs. In this, I just wanted to understand what is it that SBI Cards can control other than sourcing because we do a fab job in sourcing now. But other than sourcing, is there anything else in your control because that's what the franchise gets value for. What is it that you're able to control in the rest of the variable?
Okay, understood. Just 1 other question. This was majorly to do with what proportion of your customers have been defaulting. So, 1 is obviously the value that we tend to report in this quarter. But what proportion of these customers are reflecting in that credit cost of 9% last quarter, 9.4% this quarter. How many of these customers are still there in the pool, who can spring a surprise only?
SBI Cards and Payment Services Limited CC-Jun24.pdf · 2024-07-26
So, this is partly continuing from what the previous two que ries there by both Vishal and M B. Are we reaching a stage now where you necessarily need to prioritize asset quality stability over the growth. Is it reaching a stage where it is becoming difficult to manage both because that's the perception that now seems to have, I mean, given the swing purely in terms of our inability to manage the credit cost. I mean these are getting elevated almost in the quarter. So, if you did take the kind o f product actions and interventions that you mentioned, it's very difficult to imagine why this should continue to stay elevated. Why the credit cost should continue to stay almost record highs almost every quarter, right? And plus, we are still saying it will remain between 7% and 8%. It's not like a onetime -- so there is obviously something with the behavior of customers, which I understand. But does that necessarily mean that now you need to take a step back to take a pause, as maybe prioritize quality and stability because I'm sure the regulator is also looking at these things. We don't want to give an impression to the regulator that's becoming difficult to manage asset quality, right?
Like I mean the only reason I'm probably harping upon this is -- we have gone from about 6% credit cost nearly 2 years back. I'm sure that itself was a bit elevated at the time. We have been actually doing a lot of these portfolio intervention. Despite that these trade costs are not coming off. I mean, I understand what you're saying that there is a system wide issue around some of these things and you can’t be oblivious to that, you can’t be immune to that completely. But my only point was does it reach a stage where you then say okay fine instead of us trying to manage both the engines now? Can w e focus on one over the other a nd you're saying that's not necessarily yet?
SBI Cards and Payment Services Limited CC-Dec23.pdf · 2024-01-25
I was just wondering, 1) about all the behavioral issues that you mentioned with the multi-carded customers. And my query was regarding supposing if you carded me, Krishnan, as a multi card customer in your open market channel and if you have noticed some behavior already in the December quarter, why wouldn't you be able to switch off the Krishnan outstanding? Why would you need two more quarters to see the same? I am saying, with all the algos and the science that we do, why would you find it difficult to dial down on the customers where you have already identified across pools, across bivariate, multivariate, every cohort way that you can analyze? If you know that there are pools that are likely to give a problem, why wouldn't you be able to dial down or switch off those? 2) On the borrowing side, you are bank heavy now. Is there any thought process around wanting to diversify that a little bit better?
Okay, I understood.

The Federal Bank Limited

The Federal Bank Limited CC-Jun24.pdf · 2024-07-24
Yes. Hi. I hope I'm audible. First and foremost, hearty congrats to Shyam, and the team you have built up over the last many years. The true test is how you leave the organization from the time how you found it. I think you're leaving it in much, much better shape. I think all credit to you as you don't get due credit, you don't even seek it, but I thought that was relevant. You'll be missed. I just had one query. I mean, in the last three, four years, and probably even earlier than that, you've been very particularly focused on making sure risk is the first thing that you tend to address. There is now a tendency that your yields are sometimes probably the lowest in the system. I'm not talking about the yields that you report, but I'm saying in general, when you look at asset classes, we tend to find that Federal Bank is amongst these lowest-priced banks, right. So you get of course the creamiest asset, but it comes at the cost of you probably underpricing yourself. Is there a good risk you are leaving on the table sometimes? I mean, could you just throw some light around how you want to triangulate, revisiting th e portfolio versus not taking the unacceptable risk?
Understood. That's helpful. I mean, if I have room for one more question maybe. You did mention something about NRE deposits in your opening remarks. I don't know if this was addressed subsequently, I might have lost it. But just wanted to understand what helped you claw back your way into the NRE deposits this quarter. Why do you believe that's sustainable now?